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RECENT DECISIONS
TAXATIoN -TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY WILL PURSUANT TO VALID
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY TESTATOR NOT SUBJECT TO STATE INHERITANCE
TAX IF TESTATOR RECEIVED FULL CONSIDERATION IN MONEY'S WORTH FOR
THE PROMISED BEQUEST.- After a period of marital discord, Tranquilla Vai
filed an action for separate maintenance against her husband John. In March
1953, they entered into a property settlement agreement by which Tranquilla
was to receive less than half the community property. John, on his part, agreed
to support their mentally incompetent daughter during his lifetime; to hold
his wife harmless for their daughter's support; and also to provide in his will
that an amount of property, sufficient to support his daughter as long as she
lived, be left in a trust. Pursuant to this agreement, John executed a will in
which, after certain specific bequests, he left the residue of his estate in trust for
his daughter's support. Shortly after John's death in 1957, his wife brought an
action to rescind the property settlement agreement on the ground that he had
fraudulently concealed community assets from her. Although the California
Supreme Court adjudged Tranquilla entitled to rescind,1 she chose to enter
into a stipulation with the executors under which she received $500,000 in
return for waiving all rights under the property settlement, with the exception
of her deceased husband's promise to support their daughter. In evaluating
John Vai's estate for tax purposes, the state inheritance tax appraiser imposed
a tax on the entire residue, including the amount necessary for the daughter's
support. The executors objected to this imposition claiming that $515,341.56,
the amount at which the fund necessary for the daughter's support was capital-
ized, should be allowed as a deduction in determining the inheritance tax due.
The probate court overruled this objection, and the executors appealed. The
Supreme Court of California, Chief Justice Traynor dissenting, reversed and
held: when a testator leaves property by will pursuant to a valid contract entered
into during his lifetime, the bequest is not subject to an inheritance tax if the
testator has received for the promised bequest full consideration in money or
money's worth, within the meaning of the California inheritance tax law. In
re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705 (Cal. 1966).
The decision in Vai is based on a new construction which the California
Supreme Court gave to section 13601 of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code. That section provides, without apparent exception, that "a transfer by
will or the laws of succession of this State... is a transfer subject to this part."2
For many years, the inheritance tax provision concerning transfers by will, which
is presently section 13601, was construed to make "everything in the nature of
a change of ownership effected through a will"' taxable regardless of the reason
for such transfer. Prior to Vai, the only statutory exceptions to the taxability
of transfers for full consideration in money's worth were made in the case of
1 Va v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d 247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1961).
2 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 13601.
3 In re Grogan's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87, 89-90 (1923).
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inter vivos transfers.4 By its decision in Vai, that a transfer of property by will
pursuant to a valid contract entered into by a testator during his lifetime for
which he received full consideration in money's worth was not subject to an
inheritance tax, the California Supreme Court, in effect, grafted an exception
onto "the apparently plain language"' of the inheritance tax law where none
had previously existed.
A majority of jurisdictions, considering the taxability of transfers by will
for consideration, have reached a result contrary to Vai.8 Most state inheritance
tax statutes expressly except from taxation inter vivos transfers either in con-
templation of death or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
death, provided they are made for a valuable or money's worth consideration.7
However, courts generally have held that no such exception applies to transfers
made by will.8 Their rationale, as stated by the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
is simple.
If the legislature had intended to limit the imposition of the tax to property
passing gratuitously, it could easily have said so; but by providing that all
property passing by will should be subject to the tax, it manifested an
intention not to so limit it.
In In re Gould's Estate,"0 the New York Court of Appeals suggested a legislative
purpose in taxing all transfers made by will might well have been "to prevent
parties from avoiding payment of the tax by changing intended beneficiaries
into testamentary creditors."1 Thus, it was feared that a less than unequivocal
rule would invite easy tax avoidance schemes.
Until Vai, California had remained in line with the majority and refused
to exempt from an inheritance tax transfers of testator's property by will pur-
suant to a valid contract for valuable consideration. The leading case for this
4 Before being disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Vai, the state control-
ler's regulations, working rules for state officials in administering the inheritance tax law,
CAL. ADMINISTRATIVB CODE tit. 18, §§ 13601-13603(a) provided:
A transfer by will is subject to the Inheritance Tax Law even though made
pursuant to an agreement between the transferee and the decedent for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth which was received by the dece-
dent. In such case, the transferee takes from the decedent under the will and not
by virtue of the agreement.
In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 711 (1966).
5 In re Grogan's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87, 89 '(1923).
6 See e.g., Rooney v. Inheritance Tax Comm'n, 143 Kan. 143, 53 P.2d 500 (1936);
234 Mass. 403, 126 N.E. 44 (1920); In re Bernay's Estate, 344 Mo. 135, 126 S.W.2d 209(1939); Krug v. Douglas County, 114 Neb. 517, 208 N.W. 665 (1926); Carter v. Craig,
77 N.H. 200, 90 Atl. 598 (1914); In re Howell's Estate, 255 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931);
Sheppard v. Desmond, 169 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); In re Jones Will, 206 Wis.
482, 240 N.W. 186 (1932).
7 E.g., CAL. RIv. & TAx. Code § 13641; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1501 (1964);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 65, -§ 1 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-1(c) (1960); N.Y. TAX
LAw § 220(2); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5731.02(C) (Page Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72 § 2301(c) (1964); Tax. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 14.01 (1960).
8 E.g., In re Howell's Estate, 255 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931); Sheppard v. Des-
mond, 169 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). For other cases to similar effect, see Annot.,
157 A.L.R. 964, 973-76 (1945).
9 Carter v. Craig, 77 N.H. 200, 201, 90 At. 598 (1914).
10 156 N.Y. 423, 51 N.E. 287 (1898).
11 Id. at 428, 51 N.E. at 288.
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proposition was In re Grogan's Estate.2 In Grogan, a husband and wife en-
tered into a property settlement agreement which provided the wife would receive
$3,000 a year during her husband's life. The agreement further provided that
she would continue to receive income, after his death, from a trust fund created
by his will. The husband made a will in conformity with this agreement. When
the state inheritance tax appraiser imposed a tax on the value of the trust
created in the will, the wife claimed (as did the executors in Vai'" ) that the
will merely fulfilled the husband's obligation under the prior agreement and
did not constitute a taxable "transfer by will" within the meaning of the inheri-
tance tax law. The court rejected this contention, finding that "everything in
the nature of a change of ownership effected through a will"' 4 is taxable. As
the court viewed it, the tax was
upon the vehicle carrying the right [of succession], rather than a tax upon
the right itself. It [the inheritance tax act] is in effect a declaration of law
that when a will is used as a means of conveyance of property a tax must
be paid for that privilege.15 (Emphasis added.)
In Vai, the California Supreme Court, rather than follow Grogan, chose
to adopt the rationale of In re Belknap's Estate,6 a California district court of
appeals decision which had earlier questioned the Grogan rule.' In Belknap,
a property settlement agreement provided that a wife would receive a stipulated
monthly sum during her husband's life and that the purchase of an annuity
would be authorized for her in his will. The court held that the transfer of the
annuity was effected by virtue of the property settlement rather than by the will,
and thus its value was not subject to inheritance tax. Viewed in this light, the
wife's beneficial interest in the annuities vested under the agreement," and
nothing remained to be transferred by the will. The court stated that the will
merely served as a "conduit" by which the testator fulfilled his obligation under
an agreement enforceable by the wife without regard to the will.'9
The Vai majority thought the rationale of Belknap was "apposite" to the
situation before them.2" Vai's daughter had a right to receive the trust benefits.
This right vested at the time the property settlement agreement was made.
Thus, she could have enforced her light to support, independent of the will,
by maintaining she was a third party beneficiary under the property settlement
agreement.2 The Vai majority believed that merely because the testator satis-
fied his obligation by a provision in his will, that interest was not ipso facto
taxable.2
12 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87 (1923).
13 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 164, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 708 (1966).
14 In re Grogan's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87, 89-90 (1923).
15 219 Pac. at 90.
16 66 Cal. App. 2d 644, 152 P.2d 657 (1944).
17 152 P.2d at 661-62.
18 Id. at 661.
19 Id. at 659.
20 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 164, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 708 (1966).
21 Ibid. See Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949).
22 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 165, 52 Ca. Rptr. 705, 709 (1966).
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The California Supreme Court's adoption of the Belknap rationale was
presaged by language in certain of its earlier decisions." In In re Rath's Estate, 4
the court found that it was the intent of the inheritance tax act, gleaned from
the act as a whole, that the imposition of tax should be measured by beneficial
succession 2 The court believed that agreements extrinsic to the will should
be considered to determine whether beneficial succession had passed by those
agreements rather than by the will. If beneficial succession passed by the agree-
ment, the will was viewed as a mere "conduit of title,"26 and the transfer would
not be taxable as a transfer by will. Rath distinguished Grogan and In re Gould2
(a New York case to the same effect) on their facts.2 Though the Vai majority
noted that Rath distinguished rather than overruled Grogan,29 it is submitted
that the two theories of taxation upon which the latter two cases were decided
are inconsistent. Rath based the imposition of the tax on the substance of the
transfer, i.e., on whether a beneficial succession was effected. Grogan, however,
based the test of taxability solely on the form of the transfer."0 The demise of the
Grogan rule was clearly foreordained by Rath.
In Vai, the majority went beyond the strict words of the inheritance tax
act to speculate as to legislative intent."1 Adherence to the Grogan rule, the
court said, would lead to such "anomalous" results that the legislature could
not have intended such an unequivocal rule. In explicitly disapproving Grogan,
Justice Mosk, speaking for the Vai majority, stated:
The anomalous result of this [the Grogan] rule is that a tax must be levied
whenever a testator provides in his will that a creditor is to receive a
stated sum in payment of a debt owed by the testator, whereas the tax
would be avoided by the mere failure of the testator to specify that the
debt be paid, requiring the creditor to receive payment by means of filing
a claim against the estate. The Legislature could not have intended to
make the imposition of the tax depend upon such fortuitous considera-
tions.3 2
The "anomalous result" referred to by the majority, however, must be
qualified to some extent. Under the Grogan rule, the mere fact that a testator
provides in his will for payment of a debt would not, of itself, force his creditor
23 See In re Barter's Estate, 30 Cal. 2d 549, 184 P.2d 305, 309 (1947); In re Rath's
Estate, 10 Cal. 2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 (1937). Both cases admittedly are factually distin-
guishable from the Grogan-Vai situations. However, they are two previous instances in which
the court did not regard a technical transfer by the vehicle of a will as determinative of
taxation.
24 10 Cal. 2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 (1937).
25 75 P.2d at 511-12. The Rath court, however, admitted that no express provision
of the California Inheritance Tax Law provides that beneficial succession, rather than mere
succession is to be the measure of tax.
26 Id. at 513.
27 156 N.Y. 423, 51 N.E. 287 (1898).
28 75 P.2d at 513. In Grogan and Gould, the testator disposed of his own property,
whereas in Rath the testator devised property which he held in trust for others.
29 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 167 n.6, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 711 n.6 (Cal. 1966).
30 Compare In re Rath's Estate., 10 Cal. 2d 399, 75 P.2d 509, 511-12 (1937), with
In re Grogans Estate, 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87, 90 (1923).
31 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 166, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 710 (Cal. 1966).
32 Ibid.
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to pay an inheritance tax. As Chief Justice Traynor pointed out in his dissent,
a tax would be imposed only if the creditor accepted the bequest in payment
of the debt."8 The creditor, however, can elect to renounce the legacy 4 and file a
claim on the debt against the testator's estate. In the latter case, since the
creditor's claim would be based on the contract rather than on the will, he
could receive the sum owed him undiminished by any inheritance tax."
The court also felt that basing the imposition of an inheritance tax solely
on the testator's use of the will as a vehicle for transfer would place a premium
on violating contracts to bequeath. 6 If a testator fulfilled his contract by ex-
ecuting a will, the transfer would be taxable. However, if he breached his
agreement and failed to make a promised bequest, the disappointed beneficiary
could recover the value of the bequest tax free in an action for damages against
the estate.
3 7
In his dissent, Chief Justice Traynor took the position that adherence to
the Grogan rule would not attach a premium to contract violation, and that
the beneficiary's interest would be taxable "whether or not the decedent performs
his contract .... ""s This conclusion assumes that the remedy for a breach of
a contract to make a specified bequest is necessarily an equitable action for specific
performance.3 " Other remedies, however, are available to the beneficiary and
different tax consequences follow depending upon which remedy is used.4" In
an equitable suit for specific performance,41 the plaintiff would, as nearly as
possible, be placed in the "position he would have occupied had the contract
been performed - i.e., that of legatee or devisee.""2 The court would then
33 Id. at 174, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (dissenting opinion).
34 See Albright v. State Tax Comm'n, 233 Iowa 1303, 11 N.W.2d 578 '(1943); In re
Gould, 156 N.Y. 423, 51 N.E. 287 (1898).
35 Even granted this qualification, however, the consequence that a creditor could not
accept payment of a debt (to which he had an enforceable claim) by legacy without in-
curring an inheritance tax, would be nonetheless "anomalous."
36 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 166, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 710 (1966).
37 Ibid. See Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N.J.L. 608, 137 Atl. 552 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
See also Note, The Contractual Will and Some Consequences of its Breach, 34 VA. L. REv.
590 (1948).
38 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 174, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 718 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
39 Ibid. Justice Traynor supported his contention with the illustration of a suit for
equitable relief in In re Kidd's Estate, 188 N.Y. 274, 80 N.E. 924 (1907). That case
involved an antenuptial agreement by which a husband promised to devise property to his
stepdaughter in return for $40,000 from his wife. When the testator failed to make the
specified devise, the stepdaughter sued on the contract for equitable relief. The New York
Court of Appeals decided the recovery was taxable. The court reasoned that had decedent
performed his contract, the transfer by will would have been taxed. In enforcing the con-
tract, equity converts those who take under the will into "trustees for the beneficiary under
the original agreement .... Therefore the devolution of the property has in fact taken place
under the will, and such devolution is subject to the transfer tax." Id. at 280, 80 N.E. at 925.
40 Compare Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N.J.L. 608, 137 Atl. 552 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927),
with Daum v. Inheritance Tax Comm'n, 135 Kan. 210, 9 P.2d 992 (1932). For an analysis
of the different tax consequences of recovery in an action for damages, see Comment, Appli-
cability of Inheritance Taxation to Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 37 YALE L.J. 108 (1927).
41 Though some courts have granted relief for breach of contract to devise under the
term "specific performance," the term is a misnomer. Aside from the possibility of antici-
patory breach during his lifetime, the promisor cannot breach until death. Specific per-
formance, as such, is obviously impossible. Thus, courts sometimes use the terms "quasi-
specific performance" or "constructive trust" to describe the remedy. Hirsch, Contracts to
Devise and Bequeath, 9 WXis. L. Rxv. 388, 396 (1934).
42 Note, supra note 37, at 596.
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impose a trust on the property passing to decedent's heirs or next of kin in
favor of the plaintiff.43 Since the property would devolve under the will, the
devolution would be subject to a transfer tax.44
In an action at law for damages, however, a different result would follow.45
The plaintiff in a damage action would occupy a position analogous to a judg-
ment creditor of the decedent's estate.46 The claim would be paid by the ex-
ecutor before the will was probated. Although recovery would be practically
the same under either remedy, since recovery in a damage suit is based on
contract, it would not be subject to an inheritance taxY Thus, breach of con-
tract would be encouraged as providing a simple means of tax avoidance. Vai,
however, based the imposition of inheritance tax on beneficial succession, thus
removing the tax avoidance incentive from violation of contracts to bequeath.
Another possible avenue for tax avoidance was also foreclosed by Vai. A,
simply by exchanging his promise to devise property to B in return for con-
sideration sufficient to bind the contract,4" could confer testamentary benefits
on B not subject to inheritance tax. The consideration B gave in that situation
need not necessarily be of equivalent monetary value to the bequest. To pre-
vent this device, Vai borrowed the more stringent consideration requirement
set out in section 13641 of the inheritance tax act, dealing with inter vivos trans-
fers.49 This section states that " 'valuable and adequate consideration' is a con-
sideration equal in money or in money's worth to the full value of the property
transferred."5 " Thus, in order to exempt from taxation a transfer of property
by will made pursuant to a valid contract, B would have to give A an equivalent
in money's worth for the promised bequest. As no actual benefit would accrue
to B from this quid pro quo, the purpose of the inheritance tax act would not
be defeated.
Though the rule adopted by the majority in Vai is more logical and effi-
cient than its predecessor, the logic of Chief Justice Traynor's dissent is com-
pelling. Traynor maintained that in arriving at its holding the majority violated
some basic canons of tax statute construction.51 One of these well-known pre-
43 In re Kidd's Estate, 188 N.Y. 274, 280, 80 N.E. 924, 925 (1907).
44 Ibid.
45 E.g., Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N.J.L. 608, 137 AtI. 552 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
46 Note, supra note 37, at 596. See generally 1 PAGE, WILLS § 10.27-.28 (Bowe & Parker
ed. 1960).
47 Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N.J.L. 608, 613, 137 Atl. 552, 554 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
48 It should be noted that in Vai the consideration John received for his promise to leave
money in his will to support his incompetent daughter was suffcient consideration to support
the property settlement agreement. However, since this consideration was not measurable in
money or money's worth, within the definition of the inheritance tax act, it was not adequate
consideration for exempting the transfer from taxation under the new rule. The court,
instead, found that when Tranquilla Vai accepted $500,000 in the stipulation with the
executors of her husband's estate rather than completely rescind the agreement for fraud
this constituted money's worth consideration. Had Tranquilla rescinded the agreement, as
she was entitled to, her share of the community property probably would have been con-
siderably more than the amount she actually received. This difference, the court determined,
was the measure of consideration John Vai received in return for his promise to bequeath
property for his daughter's support. In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 169, 52 Cal. Rptr.
705, 713 (1966).
49 CAL. REV. & TAx. CoDE § 13641.
50 Ibid.
51 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 716 (1966) (dissenting
opinion). See 1 COOLEY, TAXATION 450-52 (3d ed. 1903).
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cepts is that "beyond the words employed [by the statute], if the meaning is
plain and intelligible, neither officer nor court is to go in search of the legisla-
tive intent . ,." As Justice Traynor read the language of section 13601, it
was clear and admitted of no exceptions whatever.
Nothing in the present statute or its predecessors suggests that a transfer
by will pursuant to an enforceable contract is excepted from the normal
operation of the tax. In all the years since the Legislature first selected
succession as a subject of tax [citing statute] it has never so much as in-
timated in any provision . . . that it meant to exclude from "transfer by
will" a transfer by will pursuant to a contract.53
Even if there is some ambiguity as to the meaning of a tax provision, a literal
or strict construction is favored "because presumptively the legislature has given
in plain terms all the power it has intended should be exercised."5 4 The Vai
majority incorporated an exception into the inheritance tax law in violation
of what the court itself previously conceived to be its proper function,55 i.e.,
that of only construing and applying, rather than adding to or detracting from,
the words the legislature had written.
Despite its questionable statutory foundations, the Vai decision has obvious
merit. Its rule provides a consistent basis for the imposition of inheritance tax
whether the transfer is contractual or testamentary in character. It also pre-
vents the seemingly unfair result of a beneficiary being taxed for a bequest that
was, in a sense, "bought and paid for." The rule has the further practical
merit of removing a tax restriction which inhibits the contract to bequeath from
being used as an estate planning device." It is to the California Supreme Court's
credit that it accomplished these results in Vai without opening any avenue for
tax avoidance.
John Scripp
WILLS - LAPSED RESIDUARY LEGACIES BECOME PART OF THE RESIDUE
RATHER THAN PASS BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION. - The testator, John T.
Slack, was predeceased by a residuary legatee who died without issue. On dis-
tribution of the testator's estate, the Probate Court of Windsor County, Ver-
mont, decreed that the deceased residuary legatee's share should pass as part
of the residue of the estate to the surviving residuary legatees. The estate of
the testator's widow and certain other heirs challenged this distribution asserting
that the lapsed residuary legacy should pass as intestate property. The Supreme
Court of Vermont affirmed the Probate Court and held: lapsed residuary
legacies become part of the residue and pass with the balance of it unless a
52 1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 51, at 450.
53 In re Vai's Estate, 417 P.2d 161, 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 714 (Cal. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
54 1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 51, at 453.
55 See Kirkwood v. Bank of America, 43 Cal. 2d 333, 273 P.2d 532, 536 (1954); In re
Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722, 727 (1947).
56 For a comprehensive treatment of the contract to devise as an estate planning tool,
see Sparks, Contract to Devise or Bequeath as an Estate Planning Device, 20 Mo. L. Rnv.
1 (1955).
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contrary disposition is demonstrably applicable. In re Slack Trust, 220 A.2d
472 (Vt. 1966).
By its decision in Slack, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the common
law rule, followed by a majority of the states, concerning distribution of
lapsed residuary estates. The common law rule holds that a lapsed part
of the residue does not pass into the remainder of the residue, but rather
passes to the testator's next of kin as intestate property." At the time this rule
was developed in England, it was designed to keep property within the family
estate by favoring the next of kin over residuary legatees.2 As the original pur-
pose for the rule lost its importance, however, other rationales were advanced
to support it. Some courts justified the common law rule on the basis that there
could be "no residue of a residue."' Other courts advanced the reasoning that
it was the testator's presumable intention that no residuary legatee should receive
a greater proportion of the residue than that given him by the will.' However,
most courts in applying the common law rule did so blindly, without reference
to its underlying rationale.5
It is interesting to note that later English cases have severely criticized the
common law rule and have greatly restricted its application.6 In fact, at least
one commentator has even suggested that the rule has been implicitly abandoned
in England.7 Nevertheless, this rule favoring partial intestacy in the case of
lapsed residuary legacies was incorporated into the American legal system as a
part of the English common law. Once again, most American courts simply
invoked the rule without investigating its underlying rationale.8 However, in
many cases where the rule has been considered on its merits, it has received
scathing criticism. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court so aptly stated:
The rule thus established does not commend itself to sound reasoning, and
is a sacrifice of the settled presumption that a testator does not mean to
1 6 PAGE, WILLS § 50.18 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1962) at 97. A more comprehensive state-
ment of this rule is found in Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 59, 107
N.E.2d 120, 123 (1952):
That rule of law, which was adopted from the English common law, is that
a portion of a residuary legacy or devise, which is not to a class and which lapses
or is otherwise ineffective, does not inure to the benefit of the other residuary
devisees or legatees unless the testator has specifically provided that it shall pass
to them, but instead it passes as intestate property to the heirs or next of kin of
the testator.
2 In re Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67, 23 Atl. 205 (1892).
3 "But where a legacy lapses which is part of the residue, it cannot, according to our
decisions, fall into the residue because it is itself a part of the residue, and it must pass as
intestate estate." Lyman v. Coolidge, 176 Mass. 7, 9, 56 N.E. 831, 832 (1900). Accord,
Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 546, 85 N.E 77 (1908); ATanNsox, WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1953)
at 784.
4 E.g., In rz Moloney's Estate, 15 N.J. Super. 583, 83 A.2d 837 (Hudson County Ct.
P. Div. 1951), criticizing rule as "too myopic in scope to be considered either sound, satis-
factory or convincing"; Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 173 N.E. 676 (1930); Wright v.
Wright, 225 N.Y. 329, 122 N.E. 213 (1919); Skrymsher v. Northcote, 1 Swans. 566, 36
Eng. Rep. 507 (1818); Page v. Page, 2 P. Wins. 489, 24 Eng. Rep. 828 (1728); Bagwell
v. Dry, 1 P. Wins. 700, 24 Eng. Rep. 577 (1721); 6 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 98.
5 6 PAGE, op. cit supra note 1, at 98.
6 In re Dunster, [1909] 1 Ch. 103; In re Parker, [1901] 1 Ch. 408; In re Palmer,
[1893] 3 Ch. 369.
7 2 JARMAN, WILLS 1031 n.(f) (8th ed. 1951).
8 6 PAGE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 98.
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die intestate as to any portion of his estate, and also of his plain actual
intent, shown in the appointment of general residuary legatees, that his
next of kin shall not participate in the distribution at all.9
The common law rule has also been criticized on the ground that its effect "is
to defeat the testator's intention in almost every case in which it is applied ....,,
In Slack, the Vermont court cited with approval an excerpt from Corbett v.
Skaggs," pointing out that
the statement sometimes made in support of the latter practice - that
the share of the deceased residuary legatee cannot fall into the residue
because it is itself a part of the residue - appears rather to play upon words
than to point out any real difficulty.'2
These telling criticisms prompted the Vermont court to conclude: "Other than
its large numerical following, this [common law] rule admittedly has little to
recommend it."'"
Even more expressive of the deep-seated dislike for the common law rule
is the number of devices that courts have employed to circumvent its application.
Justice Cardozo characterized this practice in the following language:
There is indeed a technical rule, reluctantly enforced by courts when tokens
are not at hand to suggest an opposite intention, that a gift of "a residue
of a residue" is not to be augmented by the lapse of another gift out of
the general residuum . . . . 4 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, in many cases, courts strain to interpret the particular terminology of a
will as creating a class gift, a joint tenancy, or a gift over.' There is also notice-
able in a number of decisions a conscious effort to interpret a will as mani-
festing an intent by the testator that lapsed residuary shares should pass to the
surviving residuary legatees. 6 Such subterfuge provoked the Vermont court
in Slack to observe that "it seems far sounder to operate under a rule which is
acceptable according to its terms, rather than its exceptions."' 7
9 In re Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67, 74, 23 Ati. 205, 206 (1892).
10 In re Dunster, [1909] 1 Ch. 103, 106.
11 111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819, 28 A.L.R. 1230, (1922), commented on with approval
in 36 HAav. L. Rav. 230 (1922), 21 Mmic. L. REv. 485 (1923).
12 Id. at 386, 207 Pac. at 822.
13 In re Slack Trust, 220 A.2d 472 (Vt. 1966).
14 Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 457, 173 N.E. 676, 678 (1930).
15 In re Randall's Will, 185 Kan. 92, 340 P.2d 885 (1959) (class gift); In re Ives'
Estate, 182 Mich. 699, 148 N.W. 727 (1914) (class gift); Roberts v. Tamworth, 96 N.H.
223, 73 A.2d 119 (1950) (class gift); Shearin v. Alien, 137 N.J. Eq. 276, 44 A.2d 210(Ct. Err. & App. 1945) (joint tenancy); In re Long's Estate, 121 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Surr. Ct.
1953) (class gift); In re Hoermann's Estate, 234 Wis. 130, 290 N.W. 608, 128 A.L.R. 89(1940) (substitution in effect a gift over); In re Dunster, [1909] 1 Ch. 103 (class gift);
In re Parker, [1901] 1 Ch. 408 (gift over).
16 Attebery v. Prentice, 158 Neb. 795, 65 N.W.2d 138 (1954); In re Zinmermann's
Estate, 122 Neb. 812, 241 N.W. 553 (1932); In re Moloney's Estate, 15 N.J. Super. 583,
83 A.2d 837 (Hudson County Ct. P. Div. 1951); Aitken v. Sharp, 93 N.J. Eq. 336, 115
AtI. 912 (1922), 31 YALE L. J. 782 (approvingly); In re Dammann's Estate, 12 N.Y.2d 500,
191 N.E.2d 452, 240 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1963), 9 N.Y.L.F. 404 (1963) (approvingly), 32
FO DHAm L. Rav. 604 (1964) (approvingly); In re Nielsen's Will, 256 Wis. 521, 41 N.W.2d
369 (1950).
17 In re Slack Trust, 220 A.2d 472, 473-74 (Vt. 1966).
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In adopting the minority rule, the Vermont Supreme Court was greatly
influenced by the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Corbett v. Skaggs,"8
the leading case for the progressive, minority view." Instead of circumventing
the question, Corbett was the first case expressly to overturn the common law
rule by judicial decision after a consideration of the rule on its merits."0 In
Corbett, the Kansas court felt compelled to adopt the minority rule because of
the rule of construction which gives predominance to the testator's intent. The
court stated:
We regard the rule that lapsed shares of deceased residuary legatees
shall be treated as intestate property as in direct conflict with the one to
which this court is definitely committed -that the actual purpose of the
testator, so far as it can be ascertained, must be given effect.2
Consistent with this argument, the court in Slack cautioned that
this is a rule of construction only, adopted because it appears to comport
most closely with the presumed intent of the testator in the usual case. It
is at all times subject to contrary expressions of intent in the instrument
by the testator.22
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the importance of the Vermont
court's decision in Slack stems not so much from the uniqueness of its holding,
but rather from its timing. Corbett was decided in 1922. Other courts, how-
ever, failed to follow its example in judicially repudiating the common law
rule until Ohio did so in 195223 and Illinois in 1956.24 Prior to Corbett, Indiana
was the only state adhering to the minority rule through court decision.25 Indiana,
however, appears to have adopted the minority position in 1873 without any
consideration of the common law rule.2"
This latest step in the advancement of the minority view through judicial
activism is encouraging, but it could very well be the last advancement by such
means. The Vermont court was fortunate because it decided Slack as a case
of first impression. It was not burdened, as are courts in almost all the other
18 111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819 (1922).
19 "This is the approach well stated in Corbett v. Skaggs . . . and we adopt the rule of
that case." In re Slack Trust, 220 A.2d 472, 474 (Vt. 1966).
20 We might now avoid deciding that question by holding - as we think the facts
justify - that in any event there are special features of the will under considera-
tion which would require a decision in favor of the surviving residuary legatees....
We prefer to rest our decision upon the general principle rather than upon excep-
tional features of the particular case. Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kan. 380, 385-86,
207 Pac. 819, 821-22 (1922).
21 Id. at 386, 207 Pac. at 822. Accord, In re Sowder's Estate, 185 Kan. 74, 340 P.2d 907(1959). Contra, In re McCoy's Estate, 193 Or. 1, 236 P.2d 311 (1951).
22 In re Slack Trust 220 A.2d 472, 474 (Vt. 1966).
23 Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952).
24 Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Ill. 2d 589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956), 55 MficH. L. Rxv. 1202
(1957).
25 Carey v. White, 126 Ind. App. 418, 126 N.E.2d 255 (1955); Hedges v. Payne, 85
Ind. App. 394, 154 N.E. 293 (1926); West v. West, 89 Ind. 529 (1883); Holbrook v.
McCleary, 79 Ind. 167 (1881).
26 Gray v. Bailey, 42 Ind. 349 (1873).
27 In re Slack Trust, 220 A.2d 472, 474 (Vt. 1966).
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states, by a series of precedents adhering to the common law rule.28 Many
courts, though highly critical of the common law rule, yield to the great weight
of stare decisis and reluctantly apply it.2 9 As the New York Court of Appeals
stated in Wright v. Wright,"° "[W]e .. . are forced to realize that as the result
of inheritance and frequent repetition the rule has become too firmly established
to be disregarded."'"
While judges are hesitant to alter by court decision a rule so firmly estab-
lished in our legal system, they are not nearly so reluctant to call upon legisla-
tures to make such changes.2 It is submitted that such an attitude on the part
of the Bench constitutes a forfeiture of its responsibility for the orderly growth
and development of the common law.3 The warning enunciated by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt of New Jersey in Fox v. Snow 4 (although it concerns a dif-
ferent matter) is highly relevant to the present situation.
To hold, as the majority opinion implies, that the only way to overcome
the unfortunate rule of law that plagues us here is by legislation, is to put
the common law in a self-imposed straitjacket. Such a theory, if followed
consistently, would inevitably lead to the ultimate codification of all of
our law for sheer lack of capacity in the courts to adapt the law to the
needs of the living present. The doctrine of stare decisis neither renders
the courts impotent to correct their past errors nor requires them to adhere
blindly to the rules that have lost their reason for being. The common
law would be sapped of its life blood if stare decisis were to become a god
instead of a guide.3 5
In the face of judicial refusal to act on the matter, a number of state legislatures
have responded to the call. As a result, the common law rule that a lapsed
residuary legacy should pass as intestate property has been completely overturned
by statutory enactments in at least five states.3
Since the common law rule concerning the distribution of lapsed residuary
estates is so firmly established by judicial decision in almost all the remaining
states, it appears that any major shift to the minority rule most likely will be
achieved through legislative change rather than judicial activism. While this
development has taken place in a limited number of states, the rate of change
28 A comprehensive listing of the cases accepting and rejecting the common law rule is
given in Annots. at 28 A.L.R. 1237 (1924), 139 A.L.R. 868 (1942) and 36 A.L.R.2d 1117
(1954).
29 E.g., In re Waln's Estate, 156 Pa. 194, 27 Adt. 59 (1893); In re Gray's Estate, 147
Pa. 67, 23 Atl. 205 (1892).
30 225 N.Y. 329, 122 N.E. 213 (1919).
31 Id. at 341, 122 N.E. at 217.
32 In re Bogardus Will, 5 Misc. 2d 607, 164 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
33 For an interesting discussion of the role played by judicial precedents in the interpre-
tation of v/ills, see Halbach, Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and Trusts,
52 CALIF. L. Rxv. 921 (1964). "The straightforward overruling of unsuitable precedent
represents less of a threat to the rule of law, simplicity and impersonality in adjudication,
and reasonable predictability than does the retention of unsound rules, hedged by their
characteristic weakness." Halbach, supra at 955.
34 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950).
35 Id. at 23, 76 A.2d at 882-83 (dissenting opinion).
36 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 49 (Smith-Hurd 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-14
(1953); OHIo R1 .CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(10)
(1950); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-6-20 (1956).
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has been far slower than one would expect in view of the virulent criticisms
leveled at the majority rule."7 Taking into account both the ingrained conserva-
tism of the Bench and the slow-moving machinery of state legislatures, there
appears to be little hope for a significant movement to the minority rule in the
near future.
It is submitted that while Slack may not lead courts in states presently
following the common law rule to reject that rule, it may influence them to
give a more liberal interpretation to the testator's intention in creating a residuary
clause in his will. In this manner, courts may achieve many of the minority
rule's beneficial results, while still professing their respect for, and adherence to,
the precedents arising under the common law. Regardless of the effect of Slack
on other states, the Supreme Court of Vermont should be commended for
allowing the principles of reason to triumph over the dictates of judicial prece-
dent in an area of law greatly in need of such a reassociation with reality.
William H. Seall
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - INTERPLEADER - Two Cmcurrs DISAGREE ON
INSURANCE COMPANIES' USE OF INTERPLEADER WHEN MULTIPLE TORT CLAIMS
AGAINST THEIR INSURED ARE IN EXCESS OF POLICY COVERAGE AND HAVE
NOT YET BEEN REDUCED TO JUDGMENT.- Plaintiffs, Underwriters at Lloyd's
and other British insurance companies, had issued liability insurance policies
to Roy H. Sheffield, Jr., d/b/a Dixie Flyers. These policies purported to in-
demnify Sheffield up to the sum of $20,000 for liability which he might incur
as a result of his crop spraying operations. Defendant cotton farmers contended
that Sheffield, while carrying on his crop spraying operations, caused more than
$50,000 damage to their cotton crops. The insurance companies sought a bill
in the nature of interpleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22' to
determine their liability under the potential claims arising from the damage.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.2 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held: a bill in the
nature of interpleader is available to insurance companies under Federal Rule
37 E.g., 6 PAGE op. cit. supra note 1, § 50.18, at 98-99; ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, §
140, at 785; 36 HARv. L. Rav. 230 (1922); 21 MICH. L. Rxv. 485 (1923); 55 MICH. L. REv.
1202 (1957); 31 YALE L. Rav. 782 (1922). See also text accompanying notes 9-10, 12-14
supra.
1 FED. R. Crv. P. 22 provides:
(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder
that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend
do not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent
of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to
any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such
interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supple-
ment and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
(2) The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no way supersedes or
limits the remedy provided by Title 28, U. S. C., §§ 1335, 1397, and 2361. Actions
under those provisions shall be conducted in accordance with these rules.
2 Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 250 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
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22 even though the claims against the insured party had not been reduced to
judgment and the injured parties could not yet assert their claims directly against
the insurance company. Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357
(8th Cir. 1966).
Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, had issued an auto-
mobile liability insurance policy with a maximum coverage of $20,000 per
accident to Ellis Clark. While this policy was in effect, Clark was involved in
a serious accident with a Greyhound bus. As a result of this accident, at least
four suits were filed in California state courts against Clark and others, seeking
recovery of damages in excess of $1,000,000. Additional suits were anticipated.
State Farm sought a bill in the nature of interpleader under the Federal Inter-
pleader Act' and also under Federal Rule 22 to determine its liability under
the potential claims arising out of the accident. The United States District
Court for the District of Oregon allowed the bill. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held: the injured parties cannot be
considered "claimants" within the jurisdictional requirements of the Federal
Interpleader Act nor "persons haviig claims against the plaintiff" within
Federal Rule 22 since, in the absence of a direct action statute, they have no
right to institute suits directly against the insurance company without first pre-
vailing in their suits against the insured party. Therefore, the action in the
nature of interpleader must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.) cert.
granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 90 (1966).
Interpleader is by no means a new remedy in the law. It was common
practice for English courts of equity, when there were conflicting claims to a
sum of money, to relieve disinterested stakeholders of the disputed sum and
determine the rights of all the various claimants. The necessity for interpleader
arises from the fact that a stakeholder runs the risk of double liability if he does
not turn the sum over to the rightful party.4 The stakeholder does not always
3 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, firm, or corporation,
association, or society having in his or its custody or possession money or property of
the value of $500 or more, or having issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of in-
surance, or other instrument of value or amount of $500 or more, or providing for
the delivery or payment or the loan of money or property of such amount or value,
or being under any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if
'(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in
section 1332 of this title, are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such
money or property, or to any one or more of the benefits arising by .virtue of
any note, bond, certificate, policy or other instrument, or arising by virtue of
any such obligation; and if
(2) the plaintiff has deposited such money.or property or has paid the
amount of or the loan or other value of such instrument or the amount due
under such obligation into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment
of the court, or has given bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount
and with such surety as the court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon
the compliance by the plaintiff with the future order or judgment of the court
with respect to the subject matter of the controversy.
(b) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are
adverse to and independent of one another.
4 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALP L.J. 814, 815 (1921).
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discharge his duty to turn the sum over to the correct claimant by turning it
over to a claimant who is in his judgment the correct one. The strict require-
ments for a bill of interpleader have been largely eliminated.6 Indeed, a bill
in the nature of interpleader is now available even when the stakeholder him-
self asserts a claim to the money in question.'
The interpleader remedy was, and still is, a popular one. It has proven
especially advantageous to insurance companies which are frequently faced with
conflicting claims to proceeds of insurance policies. The original Federal Inter-
pleader Act,' adopted in 1917, made this remedy more available to insurance
companies by enlarging the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. These
courts were permitted to make nationwide service of process upon claimants.9
Since that time, the act has been refined on a number of occasions. In 1925,
insurance associations were added to the coverage of the act.10 The statutory
remedy was extended in 1926 to include casualty and surety companies.'1 The
statute was further extended in 1936 to include "any person, firm, corporation,
association, or society."' The act was amended once again in 1948. Among
other changes, the term claimant was extended to include not only those who
"are claiming" but also those who "may claim" to be entitled to the fund in
question.1
3
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated. Rule
22, dealing with interpleader,, recognized that the common law interpleader
remedy had not been limited by the passage of the Federal Interpleader Act.14
This nile, which explicitly eliminated some of the old, strict requirements for
interpleader, was said to be "the most modem and liberal method of obtaining
interpleader to be found."' 5
Both Nichols and Tashire raise'the question of who can be considered a
5 First, the same thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against
whom the relief is demanded; second, all their adverse titles or claims must be
dependent on or be derived from a common source; third, the person asking the
relief - the plaintiff - must not have or claim any interest in the subject matter;
fourth, he must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants,
- that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position, merely,
of a stakeholder [quoting 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1332]. Platte
Valley State Bank v. National Live Stock Bank, 155 Ill. 250, 257, 40 N.E. 621, 623 (1895).
6 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 22.04 '(2d ed. 1964).
7 Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F.2d
578 (8th Cir. 1939); Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La.
1960); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938); 3 MooRE,
op. cit. supra note 6, ff 22.03; Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance Claims,
70 HAgv. L. Rv. 27, 40 (1956).
8 39 Stat. 929 (1917).
9 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 6, 11 22.06.
10 43 Stat. 976 (1925).
11 44 Stat. 416 (1926).
12 49 Stat. 1096 (1936). For an excellent account and analysis of the development of
statutory interpleader, see Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814 (1921);
Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE .L.J. 685 (1924); Chafee, Interpleader in the United
States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134 (1932); Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45
YALE L.J. 963, 1161 (1936); *hafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE
L.J. 377 (1940); Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 Hazv. L. REV.
541, 929 (1943).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964). See note 3 supra.
14 Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: II, 45 YALE L.J. 1161, 1i67-69 (1936).
15 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 6, ff 22.04, at 3007.
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"claimant" under either statutory or rule interpleader. The statute provides
that the remedy is available when "two or more adverse claimants . . . are
claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money or property, or to any...
benefits arising by virtue of any... policy or other instrument .... ,1 (Emphasis
added.) The rule similarly provides that "persons having claims against the
plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their
claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple
liability."'' 7 (Emphasis added.)
In both cases, the injured parties contended that they could not be con-
sidered "claimants" or as "having claims" against the insurance companies
in the absence of a direct action statute, which would have allowed them to
proceed directly against the companies. Since they had not secured a final judg-
ment against the insured, the injured parties contended that they could not be
deemed as having claims against the insurance companies for the purpose of
interpleader jurisdiction. The insurance companies, on the other hand, argued
that the mere possibility defendants might be successful in their suits against
the insured parties meant that they were claimants within the meaning of both
statutory and rule interpleader. They contended that since defendants "may
claim" against the companies, they fell within the statute. Likewise, since the
companies "may be exposed" to double or multiple liability, they felt the injured
parties should be treated as claimants within the meaning of the rule.
Whether the word "claimant" includes someone who may have a claim
in the future had presented considerable difficulty to insurance companies seek-
ing statutory interpleader in the past. In Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co.,"5 the
Eighth Circuit held that such contingent liability would not entitle an insurance
company to file a bill in the nature of interpleader until all potential claims
against the insured party had been adjudged. The Klaber case was brought
under the 1926 Federal Interpleader Statute which allowed the remedy when
"two or more adverse claimants . . .are claiming to be entitled to such money
or property . . . . M' Significantly, the "may claim" provision found in the
present act was missing from the 1926 statute." Had it been there, Klaber
might well have been decided differently.2 ' Since the 1948 act restored the
"may claim" clause, Klaber's value as precedent is doubtful.22
In Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere,2" the United States District
16 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964). See note 3 supra.
17 FED. R. Cr. P. 22. See note 1 supra.
18 69 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1934).
19 44 Stat. 416 (1926).
20 The "may claim" clause in the original interpleader act was omitted from the 1926
Act in order to secure its passage. Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934, 939 (8th Cir.
1934).
21 This is suggested by certain language in Klaber:
No insurer should be denied the benefits which were intended to be conferred by
the act [1926], but, on the other hand, since the courts have no legislative powers,
they have no right to extend the unusual authority granted by the act to cases which
do not fairly fall within its provisions liberally construed. Kiaber v. Maryland
Cas. Co., supra note 20, at 939.
22 A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 6, 1 22.08[2]; Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of
1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 420 (1940).
23 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
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Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana allowed a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader in order to bring all persons injured in an automobile accident into
court to present their claims against the insurance company in one action. Judge
J. Skelly Wright, in a scholarly opinion, suggested that "under the 'may be
exposed' clause of Rule 22 and the 'may claim' clause of the [1948] Interpleader
Act, it would not seem to matter how remote the danger [of claims against the
insurance company] might be."2 Pan American differed from Klaber, however,
since Louisiana has a statutes allowing injured parties to bring a direct action
against the liability insurer, whereas there was no such statute in Klaber.
The absence of a direct action statute, however, did not prevent a federal
district court in Indiana from allowing a bill in the nature of interpleader in a
recent case involving multiple claims against insured parties. In Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Adams,2" numerous claims resulted when an explosion in the
Coliseum at the Indiana State Fairgrounds killed more than seventy persons
and injured more than three hundred. The court, unimpressed by the absence
of a direct action statute, pointed out that one of the major advantages to be
gained by the use of interpleader is the equitable distribution of insurance policy
proceeds when it is apparent that the actual and potential claims will far exceed
the policy coverage. Shortly after Commercial Union was decided, however,
a federal district court in Ohio held in National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of
North America28 that the absence of a direct action statute would prevent an
insurance company from using Rule 22 interpleader when the claims against
the insured had not yet been reduced to judgment.
The utter confusion in the case law on this subject can best be attributed
to the basic ambiguity in the language of both the Federal Interpleader Act
and Federal Rule 22. This ambiguity has provided courts with freedom to
weigh the advantages to be gained by the use of interpleader in multiple tort
claims situations against the potential disadvantages its use might entail.29
Liability insurers seek to use the interpleader device in multiple claim situations
since they fear that unless all claims against their insured are disposed of in one
action, they might be required, after exhausting the fund under the policy in
paying some judgments, to pay additional sums to other claimants on the theory
that the fund should have been prorated. It is apparent that the dangers to
insurance companies of a multiplicity of suits and possible excess liability are
significant reasons for allowing interpleader to be used in multiple tort claims
situations." Indeed, this rationale forms the very basis for interpleader.
24 Id. at 482.
25 LA. RnV. STAT. § 22:655 (1959).
26 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
27 Id. at 867. In the Commercial Union case, the insurance coverage amounted to ap-
proximately $1,000,000. As of the date of the hearing, 129 suits involving claims arising
out of the explosion had been filed against one of the insured parties. The total prayers of
these suits exceeded $11,107,500. Id. at 862-63.
28 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
29 For an excellent discussion of this whole problem, see Pan American Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
30 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams. 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964); Pan
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, supra note 29; 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 551 (Wright ed. 1961); Keeton, supra note 7, at 40-46. See Texas v.
[Vol. 42:433]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Furthermore, courts must consider the advantages to be gained by the
equitable distribution of the insurance proceeds when it is apparent that the
claims will be far in excess of policy coverage and the tortfeasor will be unable
to satisfy them. 1 In Tashire, the insurance company alleged that the claims
,arising out of the accident would exceed $1,000,000. The $20,000 insurance
coverage could thus be depleted by the first or second successful claimant. In
Nichols, it was alleged that the claims totaled more than $50,000, whereas the
insurance coverage amounted to only $20,000. In both these cases, the unavail-
ability of interpleader would encourage an unseemly race to the courthouse by
injured parties attempting to lay first claim to the insurance money. Of course,
since there is always the possibility of delay in reaching actual judgment against
the tortfeasor, the race might not of itself determine who shall ultimately cap-
ture the prize." As one noted commentator has observed:
Instead of a haphazard looting of a fund by the first comers, a bill in the
nature of interpleader filed before numerous judgments have ripened
assures a fair share of the insurance money to each victim and conforms
to the principle, "Equity is equality."' 3"
It should be noted, however, that this argument in favor of interpleader,
based on the equitable distribution of the funds, assumes that the tortfeasor is
either insolvent or would be unable to satisfy out of his own resources all claims
that might be adjudged against him. In both Nichols and Tashire, it was
doubtful that the insured parties could have paid all possible judgments. How-
ever, in multiple tort claim situations where it is apparent that the insured tort-
feasor can satisfy all the claims which might be urged against him, the insurance
company's use of interpleader could result in serious hardships upon individual
claimants. In such a case, since the tortfeasor would be able to satisfy claims
in excess of policy coverage, the disposition of the insurance proceeds would be of
little importance to the ultimate satisfaction of the claims. Nevertheless, the in-
surance company, in an attempt to minimize litigation costs by joining all in-
jured parties in a single action, would still seek interpleader where it would be
of no benefit to the claimants. In this situation, the individual claimants would
be forced to bring their suits en masse in a court which may be far removed from
their homes. Interpleader would result in a further disadvantage to claimants
if one considers the possible adverse psychological effect the presentation of
multiple claims might have on a jury. This factor is significant in cases where
the claims represent considerable sums of money. A jury might tend to be less
generous when presented with multiple claims against one tortfeasor than it
would have been if it had only one claim to consider. Of course, having one jury
determine all claims tends to insure a more equitable distribution of the policy
proceeds since the jury will presumably award damages in a consistent manner.
Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 297 F.2d 787 (P.C. Cir.
1961); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938).
31 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 867 (S.D. Ind. 1964)..
32 Maryland Gas. Co. v. Glassell-Taylor & Robinson, 156 F.2d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 1946).
33 Chafee, supra note 14, at 1166.
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Provision might also be made to allow the use of 'different juries for each claim.
Viewed in this light, Tashire may well reflect an unarticulated judicial reluctance
to deprive injured parties of the right to bring action against the tortfeasor in the
federal district court of their own choice as well as to accord claimants the full
benefits of trial by jury.
In Nichols and Tashire, which were decided on the same day, two federal
appellate courts reached diametrically opposed conclusions on the same basic
fact-situation. Even though the problem presented in these cases is a commonly
recurring one, this area of the law remains uncertain. The United States Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in Tashire.34 It is to be hoped that the Court will
resolve the present uncertainty by deciding that the advantages to be gained by
the equitable distribution of insurance proceeds to all successful claimants war-
rants the use of interpleader in a situation where the claimants could not other-
wise obtain satisfaction of their judgments against the tortfeasor. This was The
result reached by the Eighth Circuit in Nichols. It is submitted that such' a
result is preferable to that arrived at by the Ninth Circuit in Tashire.
Dennis M. Kelly
RELEASE - GENERAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS -CONSTRUED As BARRING
RELEASOR'S SUBSEQUENT CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION. --- An automobile driven
by Wortha Benjamin collided with an automobile operated by Charles Norton,
in which Norton's wife was a passenger. Approximately one month later, Ben-
jamin signed a general release in standard printed form., The essential clause
of this release stated that the signer does
hereby release, acquit and discharge said party or parties from all claims
and demands, actions and:causes of action, damages, cost, loss of service,
expenses and compensation on account of, or in any way growing out of
personal injuries, whether known or unknown to me at the present time.
and property damage resulting or to result..
When the Nortons brought an action for personal injuries, Benjamin filed an
answer which included a cross-claim against plaintiff-husband for indemnity
or contribution of the amount of any damages recovered by plaintiff-wife. The
husband pleaded the general release executed by defendant as a bar to defen-
dant's cross-claim. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, on a question
certified to it by the United States District Court for 'the District, of Maine,
held: the release was clearly designed to adjust, settle and terminate all claims
and demands which the releasor might have- against the plaintiff-husband
,
including any claim for contribution. Norton v.- Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me.
1966).
The precise question presented by Norton was whether a general release
of all claims arising from an accident included a claim for contribution,, although
34 Tashiie v.- State Farm Fire 8 Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.X) dert. granted,',87 'Sup.
Ct. 90 (1966).
[Vol. 42: 439]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
such a claim was not specifically referred to in the language of the release. In
jurisdictions which recognize a right of contribution among tortfeasors,' this
question has been both a recurring and troublesome one. Aside from variations
in the relationship between the driver and passenger or passengers in the one
car and the damage suffered by the driver of the other, the situation in Norton
is typical. There is a collision between two vehicles. The driver and passenger
of one car are injured while the other driver suffers damage to his vehicle. The
latter driver negotiates with the former's insurer for his property damage. In
consideration of a nominal amount of money,2 he signs a general release, think-
ing he is only releasing claims for any injuries and property damage to himself.
Later, he discovers that he has also released his claim for contribution against
the other driver. This claim for contribution, which may be worth many thou-
sands of dollars,' is a claim which the releasor did not contemplate4 and probably
never understood at the time of negotiation. It is obvious that the releasor never
intended to release such a valuable right. Yet, a literal reading of the release
leads courts to conclude that the releasor did intend to release his claim for
contribution. Determining the scope of a release, therefore, depends upon
whether or not courts will permit extrinsic evidence to be introduced to clarify
the parties' intent as manifested in the instrument.
Since a release is a type of contract,5 it is subject to all the rules governing
the interpretation of contracts, including the parol evidence rule. This rule
states that in the absence of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, extrinsic evidence
of preceding or accompanying negotiations will not be admitted to vary or con-
tradict the terms of a written instrument which is definite and clear on its face.6
Courts will, however, admit extrinsic evidence to interpret a contract where
there is some ambiguity in the language of the release.7 Whether a court will
find an ambiguity in a release, such as that which confronted the Maine court in
Norton, depends upon the court's initial response to such a release and its atti-
tude toward the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties' inten-
tion.8
A substantial majority of courts which have passed on the question raised
in Norton have given full effect to the general language of the release and have
been unwilling to admit extrinsic evidence to prove that the right of contribu-
1 "[C]ontribution among tortfeasors is now in effect, in one form or another, in about half
of the states . . . ." Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT-
FEASORS ACT (1955 Rev. Act).
2 In Norton, defendant submitted an itemized bill to plaintiff-husband's claims adjuster
for $1,011.16. Defendant subsequently settled this claim for $876.16. Norton v. Benjamin, 220
A.2d 248, 250 (Me. 1966).
3 The plaintiff-wife in Norton claimed personal injuries in the amount of $50,000 plus
Interest and costs. Complaint, p. 3, Norton v. Benjamin, Civil No. 8-133, D. Me., March 11,
1965.
4 Counsel for both sides in Norton stipulated that no discussion of contribution or indem-
nity took place between the adjuster and the defendant. Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248,
250 (Me. 1966).
5 Little Rock Packing Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.
1959); Westfall v. Motors Ins. Corp., 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96 (1962).
6 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961).
7 Id. § 627.
8 Havighurst, Principles of Construction and the Parol Evidence Rule as Applied to Re-
leases, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 599, 612-13 (1965).
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tion was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of settlement.'
In the leading case of Killian v. Catanese,"0 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
faced with a release similar to the one in Norton, held that since there was no
attempt made to limit its scope, the instrument indicated a clear intention to
release the additional defendant from all liability, including liability for con-
tribution."
What support there is for the opposite conclusion is based on the proposi-
tion that at the time of settlement, a right of contribution is a right subsequently
maturing. It is believed that such a future right cannot be released unless it
is specifically referred to or falls within the fair meaning of the language in the
instrument.' In Leitner v. Hawkins,' the Court of Appeals of Kentucky was
faced with a release similar in its inclusive language to that in Norton, especially
as to the release of all claims "known and unknown."' 4 Despite this all-inclusive
reference, the court held:
At the time the release above was signed, obviously no demand for con-
tribution could have been made. This right subsequently matured, and
it is the general law that demands subsequently maturing are not as a
rule discharged by the release unless expressly provided for or falling
within the fair import of the terms of the release .... The release purports
no such meaning or intent, and we would be going far afield so to declare.1 5
In rejecting the reasoning of the Leitner decision, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine retorted that "as to this we-say only that in our view the right
to contribution was inchoate and releasable and was embraced within the fair
meaning and intent of certain of the inclusive phrases in the release in the
instant case."'" (Emphasis added.) Thus, the differences in result, as previously
suggested, can be attributed to the initial judicial response to a release. While
the court in Norton found that the claim for contribution was "within the fair
9 Id. at 613. See e.g., Berman v. Plotkin, 172 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Brown v.
Ealdn, 50 Del. 574, 137 A.2d 385 (Super. Ct. 1957); McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 136
S.E.2d 218 (1964); Polley v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 417 Pa. 549, 207 A.2d 900 '(1965); Mayer v.
Knopf, 396 Pa. 312, 152 A.2d 482 (1959); Killian v. Catanese, 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379
(1954).
10 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379 (1954).
11 Id. at 595-96, 101 A.2d at 380.
12 Edester v. Heady, 364 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Leitner v. Hawkins, 311 Ky.
300, 223 S.W.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1949); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. WaIdroup, 38 N.J.
Super. 419, 119 A.2d 172 (1955).
13 311 Ky. 300, 223 S.W.2d 988 '(Ct. App. 1949).
14 Id. at 302, 223 S.W.2d at 989.
15 Id. at 303-04, 223 S.W.2d at 990.
16 Benjamin v. Norton, 220 A.2d 248, 253. Contra, Havighurst, supra note 8, at 611:
Although many rights which are thus inchoate at the time of the release might
appear -to fall within the literal coverage, it may be said that when a release is
pleaded as a defense against claims which were not matured at the time of its execu-
tion, inquiry concerning purpose becomes relevant, and extrinsic evidence should be
admitted.
For cases lending support to Havighurst's statement, see Rotberg v. Dodwell & Co., 152 F.2d
100 (2d Cir. 1945); Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kershaw v. Ker-
shaw Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 447 '(M.D. Ala. 1962); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
v. General Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp. 870, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hutton v. La France, 198 Cal.
App. 2d 19, 17 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); MacFarland's Case, 330 Mass. 573,
115 N.E.2d 925 (1953).
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meaning and intent" of the release,' the Kentucky court in Leitner looked at
the circumstances and held that "the release purports no such meaning or
intent."' 8
Having taken note of these contrary views, the court in Norton concluded:
on the balance we are persuaded that the Pennsylvania rule better accords
with the familiar and accepted application of the parol evidence rule and
will in the long run better serve the policy of fostering and encouraging
the settlement of claims. 19
While it is conceded that "society gains most from the certainty and finality of
such settlements,"' 0 it is submitted that when a general release in standard
printed form makes no specific reference to claims for contribution, an ambiguity
arises and extrinsic evidence should be admitted to clarify a party's intention
to release such a right."
This is not to say that the general release has no proper place in the realm
of settlement. Rather, it is to say that the general all-inclusive release, in standard
printed form, is too often used by insurance companies to deprive a party of
claims which he did not contemplate when he signed the release. What has
resulted, is the widespread use of printed forms, such as that in Norton, con-
taining blanks for the parties' names, the place of accident and the consideration
for the release. These releases generally contain a compilation of form book
phrases, and are usually drafted by the insurance company seeking the release.2 '
All too often, a party who has signed such a release intending only to discharge
claims for personal injuries and property damage done to himself, subsequently
learns that he has discharged a valuable claim for contribution against a joint
tortfeasor.
In this context, the Maine court's answer to the Leitner decision, that the
right to contribution is inchoate, releasable, and embraced within the fair mean-
ing of certain phrases within the release, is more a rationalization of its position
than a recognition of the real problem. This is likewise true of the court's further
statement that "one who purports to release all claims should clearly specify
any that he intends and desires to reserve . . . ,,11 It is submitted that the
Leitner decision is more in accord with reality. While Leitner iecognizes that
the right to contribution may be released before it matures, it requires an express
provision or some other clear expression that a given right *as intended to be
released. Whether the term inchoate, or future maturing right, is used, the
17 220 A.2d at 253.
18 Leitner v. Hawkins, 311 Ky. 300, 304, 223 S.W.2d 988, 990.
19 220 A.2d at 253.
20 Id. at 251.
21 This view is substantiated by the negative implications of certain language in Oxford
Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d 362, 366, 190 N.E.2d 230, 231-32, 239 N.Y.S.2d 865,
867 (1963):
In sum, the plaintiff corporation's promise, contained in an integrated- agreement
reached after lawyer-guided negotiations and containing provisions quite unlike the
stereotyped verbiage found in the usual standard general release, permits no conclu-
sion other than that the plaintiff intended to release everyone who participated ....
(Emphasis added.)
22 Havighurst, supra note 8, at 606. - ,
23 Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 253 (Me. 1966).
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ordinary layman, when negotiating the satisfaction of his particular claims, is
concerned with his immediate damages. He neither contemplates nor under-
stands any right to contribution. To require this layman, who signs the general
release prepared by the insurance company, to expressly reserve a right which
he does not comprehend is grossly inequitable. Yet judicial decisions such as
Norton encourage insurance companies to use general all-inclusive releases as
a means of depriving uninformed parties of a subsequently maturing claim for
contribution.
The general release is used in a variety of contexts other than the situation
in Norton. A number of courts which have been called upon to interpret a
general release have allowed the instrument to be limited on the basis of the
circumstances surrounding its execution.24 These cases stand for the proposition
that a person who executes a general release does not relinquish claims of which
he has no knowledge and that the intention of the parties as shown by extrinsic
evidence at the time the release was executed may be used to interpret an all-
inclusive release. An examination of the circumstances in Norton would have
made it clear that the defendant Benjamin did not intend to release his right
to contribution. The view favoring the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is a
more modem one and would have resulted in a more equitable solution in
Norton.2 5
The court's reasoning in Norton is somewhat anomalous. By finding no
ambiguity in the printed release, it applied the parol evidence rule. The court
believed that such a determination would serve the cause of certainty and finality
in the law. The question remains: for whom is the law certain and final? In-
surance companies, having many of these releases in their possession, can be
certain that their interests are protected since they will not be called upon to
defend a suit for contribution. However, it is just as certain that the average
layman will continue to sign such all-inclusive releases, thinking he is only
releasing claims for his own injuries and property damage. A possible reason
for the court's refusal to allow extrinsic evidence to be used in Norton may have
been the court's desire to protect the great number of outstanding releases
similar to the one at bar.26 It is submitted, however, that a ruling by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine that it would refuse to interpret any such release
24 E.g., United States v. Ramstad Constr. Co., 194 F. Supp. 379 (D. Alaska 1961) '(sub-
contractor's release); Graham v. Taller & Cooper, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1950)(recital on check for vacation pay); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505 (1959);
Simon v. Simon, 274 App. Div. 447, 84 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1948) '(divorce settlement); Meil v.
Syracuse Constructors, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 39, 247 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (automobile
accident).
25 Four states have enacted statutes which would allow this result. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1542(1954); Rv. CODES MONT. § 58-510 (1947); 1 N.D. ANN. CoDE § 9-13-02 (1959); 3 S.D.
CODE § 47-0241 (1939). CAL. CIv. CoDE § 1542 provides:
A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or
suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by
him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor. , ,
For a thorough analysis of this statute's application to the general release and the protection
of .the releasee in the absence of a statute, see Casey v. p'roctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579,
28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963). See also Heath v. Utah HomeFire Ins. Co., 89 Idaho 490, 406
P.2d 341 (1965) and Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203 N.E.2d 237 (1964),
which follow Casey.
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obtained in the future as including a right to contribution unless it was specifically
referred to in the instrument would better serve the ends of justice. It would
be no hardship for insurance companies to include such a reference in a printed
release to protect their interests. On the other hand, the layman confronted
with such a phrase as release of all future rights of contribution, although he
might not understand the terminology, would at least be put on notice to inquire.
Robert R. Rossi
26 One of the reasons plaintiff gave for seeking certification 6f the question of law to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was its:
great importance to the insurance industry, especially as it relates to the settlement
negotiations and trial of pending and future actions, as there are vast numbers of so-
called general releases which might be affected, and which make no specific mention
of actions for contribution or indemnity. Plaintiff's Exhibit "A," Norton v. Benjamin,
Civil No. 8-133, D. Me., March 11, 1965.
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